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1. Introduction
 The aim of this paper is to describe verbal irony, banter, litotes and 
euphemism from an argumentative point of view, especially by referring to 
the Argumentative Polyphony Theory (APT) as well as to the Semantic 
Blocks Theory (SBT) , both founded by Carel (2011a) . By analysing 
figures and expressions in this way, we will see that ironic utterances and 
expressions of politeness are on the same scale and that by regulating 
this scale, we can work out such intermediate expressions as litotes and 
euphemism. 
 Two relatively recent works on irony have been written within the two 
frameworks just mentioned above: Ducrot (2010) (APT) and Carel (2011b) 
(SBT), but their conclusions are valid only for the typical antiphrastic irony 
case and these theories' actual devices cannot adequately distinguish the four 
figures of speech examined in this paper.
 Based on these two theories, this paper provides a global picture 
not only of typical irony and banter, but also of ironical litotes ( ‘ You are 
a bit drunk ’ , while this person is extremely drunk) and bantering litotes 
( ‘ Your idea is not stupid ’ for an excellent idea). As for euphemism, it can 
be distinguished into two subcategories: the mitigative euphemism and the 
condescending euphemism. 
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2. SBT and APT: Basic notions２）
 SBT and APT are both argumentativist theories, in that they are based 
on the idea that the meaning of an utterance is to be described, essentially, 
argumentatively. The meaning of an utterance is not to be calculated by 
judging the truthfulness of what is said (the referential meaning), but by 
considering its argumentative potential (the ‘ argumentative aspect ’ of an 
utterance, presented in 1. 1. below). 
 The SBT is concerned with the description of the structural meaning 
of an utterance, while the APT is a theory about bringing those structurally 
defined semantic contents into discourse. Instead of developing the 
theoretical discussion extensively, let us examine some basic ideas of these 
two theories necessary for this paper's investigation.
2.1 Semantic Blocks Theory (SBT)
 The SBT is Carel's main theory about language and could be positioned 
on the extended line of the French argumentativist current in Anscombre 
and Ducrot (originally proposed by Anscombre and Ducrot 1983), but it 
must be considered as a critically elaborated version of the latter. First 
of all, among argumentative theories, the SBT has one of the most radical 
points of view on language and its research: its objective does not consist 
in elucidating the argumentative nature of language, but it considers that 
language itself is constructed as a system of argumentation.
 For example, in SBT, the sentence ‘ It's a fine day today ’ is not 
considered to be a representation of an extra-linguistic weather condition; 
on the contrary, the meaning of this sentence cannot be clarified as such, but 
can only be known in a particular argumentative chain like ‘ It's a fine day 
today, so let's go on a picnic ’, as ‘ fine-weather-suitable-for-going-out ’ . The 
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identical sentence ‘ It's a fine day today ’ could have a fairly different meaning 
in ‘ It's a fine day today, so you must use sunscreen ’, which should be 
described as something like ‘ fine-weather-threatening-health-and-beauty ’ .
 In this way, the theory's basic idea is that an utterance gets its meaning 
in an ‘ argumentative chain ’ (enchaînement argumentatif, which is the 
minimal unity of utterance) such as ‘ P therefore (TF) Q ’ or ‘ P nevertheless 
(NL) NEG-Q ’, in which ‘ NEG ’ means the negation or its semantic equivalent. 
This theory is called Semantic Blocks Theory because of the argumentative 
relations between P and Q that can be brought together in four contrastive 
ways: P TF Q, P NL NEG-Q, NEG-P TF NEG-Q and NEG-P NL Q. In this 
four-sided block, P and Q maintain the same meanings and when they are 
connected with TF, the argumentative chain is called ‘ normative ’ and when, 
in contrast, they are connected with NL, the argumentative chain is called 
‘ transgressive ’  .３） In this sense, the sentence ‘ It's a fine day today ’ in ‘ It's a 
fine day today, so let's go on a picnic ’ is a constituent of a different semantic 
block from the one used in the same sentence ‘ It's a fine day today, so you 
must use sunscreen ’ .
　P TF Q NEG-P TF NEF-Q　
　‘ fine weather, so going out ’ ‘ not fine weather, so staying inside ’　
　P NL NEG-Q NEG-P NL Q　
　‘ fine weather, even so staying inside ’ ‘ not fine weather, even so going out ’　
Figure 1: Semantic block
 One additional notion about the SBT must be introduced: it is called the 
‘ argumentative aspect (aspect argumentatif ) ’ . The term ‘ aspect ’ here has 
nothing to do with the grammatical category used for a verb or a predicate's 
aspect, but it is an abstract formalisation for putting together various 
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argumentative chains belonging to the same semantic block derivable from 
language itself. For example, the three argumentative chains (and more) can 
be said to be instantiations of the same argumentative aspect: ‘ fine weather 
TF go out ’ .
(1)　a.　It's a fine day today, shall we go on a picnic?４）
　 　b.　With this weather, the beach will be crowded.
　 　c.　If it's fine tomorrow, maybe I will walk to my office.
 The argumentative aspect is therefore a kind of ‘ label ’ or ‘ name-tag ’ of 
different argumentative chains sharing the same argumentative nature. 
2.2 Argumentative Polyphony Theory
 The APT is, as the name indicates, a critical development of the 
linguistic polyphony theory by Ducrot (1984) and it can be also considered 
as a theoretical update of Ducrot's polyphony theory combined with the 
SBT. In other words, it is a theory supposed to describe how the semantic 
content ５） of the utterance (properly formulated by the SBT) is brought into 
the speech act level: the APT describes therefore how the semantic contents 
of the utterance are disposed in discourse and what is finally communicated 
by the utterance. It is called ‘ polyphony theory ’ because this theory's main 
point is that we can observe more than one voice in a single utterance, 
while it is generally admitted that it is always and exclusively the speaker 
who takes responsibility for the content of the utterance. This polyphonic 
nature of the utterance can be presented clearly by an utterance containing 
negation:
(2)　Okinawa is not a strategic colony of the United States.６）
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 According to the APT, there are (at least) two voices realised in this 
negative utterance: the first is the one with the semantic content: [Okinawa 
is a strategic colony of the United States] and the second is the negation of 
the first: NEG-[Okinawa is a strategic colony of the United States]. What 
is actually said by this utterance is a sort of objective truth and one can 
resort to a simple affirmative sentence to say the same thing: ‘ Okinawa 
belongs to Japan ’ . Utterance (2) is used precisely in order to communicate 
that the content [Okinawa is a strategic colony of the United States] 
can be considered to be debatable and the speaker presents firstly this 
content, which could be said by his/her interlocutor or by a third person 
and secondly, that he/she rejects it by the negative content.７） According 
to the theory, in a negative utterance, there are always two contents: the 
affirmative and the negative conceived by two different voices.
 To demonstrate that this kind of observation is not merely a speculative 
one but has some scientific validity, Ducrot (ibid.) refers to the connective 
‘ on the contrary (au contraire) ’ . Let us see it in the following example we 
created to explain it:
(3)　 The ‘ proactive contribution to peace ’ is not pacifistic, on the contrary, it 
is militaristic.
 The ‘ proactive contribution to peace ’ is the actual Japanese prime 
minister's alleged pacifistic slogan, while his actual security policy is far from 
pacifistic, which is communicated by this utterance. Now, the connective ‘ on 
the contrary ’ implies a contrary (or contradictory) relation between the two 
contents X and Y of ‘ X, on the contrary, Y ’, which is not the case in example 
(3). The fact that a political slogan is not pacifistic and the fact that it is 
militaristic are not in contrary (or contradictory) relation: they are, rather, 
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in a paraphrastical relation to each other. What then could be marked in a 
contrary relation by this connective ‘ on the contrary ’? It is the affirmative 
content of the first utterance: ‘ The “proactive contribution to peace” is 
pacifistic ’, which is in a contrary relation with the other ( ‘ it is militaristic ’ ) 
and which means we assume two contents in a negative utterance. The APT 
is a theory concerned with such a plurality of voices in one utterance and it 
tries to make clear the mechanism of the polyphonic nature in an utterance. 
To do so, the APT proposes two notions called tones and textual functions 
by Carel, and this paper proposes to rename the latter utterance modes with 
some necessary theoretical modifications. Now, let us briefly address these 
two notions.
2.2.1  Tones
 In the previous section, the term ‘ voice ’ was used to make it easy to 
understand the basic idea of polyphony theories (and also because it was the 
term used in Ducrot's linguistic polyphony theory; Ducrot ibid.). However, 
in the APT framework, it is the term ‘ tone ’ which is used to theorise the 
plurality of voices in one utterance. As this notion will not be exploited so 
much in this paper, we just give the prerequisite of this notion. Tone is an 
abstract label for the semantic content indicating by whose voice this content 
is presented. This paper presents just three principal tones introduced in the 
theory: Speaker's tone, World's tone and Other's tone.
 Speakerʼs tone : the tone for presenting the semantic content as the one 
conceived by the speaker him/herself.
(4)　 Exerting the right to collective self-defence, Japan will be more 
militaristic than ever.
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The semantic content in this utterance is presented as conceived by the 
speaker him/herself, bearing the Speaker's tone. It is conceived by the 
speaker because the prediction about the Japanese militaristic nation is a 
judgement given by the speaker him/herself and not one he/she learned, for 
example, by hearsay. Expressions like ‘ I find that ’, ‘ I think that ’, are therefore 
to be explicit Speaker's tone markers.
Worldʼs tone : a tone the semantic content takes on when the speaker 
considers it as factual and presents it as such.
(5)　 The Abe administration, in a Cabinet decision made on Tuesday 
[ … ] changed the government's longstanding interpretation of the 
Constitution so that Japan can exercise the right to collective self-
defence.  
(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/07/02/editorials/abe-guts-
article-9/)
The semantic content of this utterance is not the one conceived by the 
speaker (or the writer of this article) or by his/her own judgement. On the 
contrary, it is considered as factual matter and presented as such by the 
speaker. The World's tone is often taken on in news stories, as in example 
(5) (even though they do not always communicate factual matters).
Otherʼs tone : when a semantic content takes on this tone, it is not conceived 
by the speaker or considered as factual by him/her. He/she reports, so to 
speak, a semantic content uttered by someone else. 
(6)　 I ’ve heard that the Indian government is eager to build new nuclear 
power plants, saying: ‘ Japanese people are living normally despite all 
the radiation. ’  
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(http://www.dianuke.org/two-years-of-fukushima-some-messages-
from-japan-to-india/)
The expression ‘ I ’ve heard that ’ is a typical Other's tone marker.
 By showing all these tones, it can be said that while the physical subject 
who pronounces an utterance is the speaker him/herself, several tones can 
be involved according to the nature of the semantic content expressed in the 
utterance.
2.2.2  Utterance modes
 This paper has so far presented the SBT and the APT, trying to be 
substantially loyal to Carel's frameworks. In this section, however, by 
introducing the notion of utterance mode to replace the original APT notion: 
textual function, we will dare to give a revised version of APT, hoping it will 
give an improvement to the theory.
 As we have seen, the semantic content of an utterance can take on 
different tones. Independently of these tones, the APT proposes that the 
speaker's attitude must be taken into account for an utterance. The speaker 
can therefore endorse, grant or reject the content, whatever tone it takes 
on. These are the three principal utterance modes, originally called textual 
functions, of the semantic content.
Endorsing : when the speaker foregrounds the semantic content, in the 
sense that he/she intends to continue his/her discourse according to the 
argumentative orientation of the content, the speaker is said to endorse this 
semantic content.
(7)　 Okinawa is not a strategic colony of the United States; I am strongly 
against the in-prefecture relocation plan of the base.
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Even though it seems to be evident, it is because the speaker endorses the 
content of the first part of (7), ‘ Okinawa is not a strategic colony of the 
United States ’, that he/she can continue his/her utterance in the second part: 
‘ I am strongly against the in-prefecture relocation plan of the base ’ . This 
apparent evidence will be shaken when we will see, for example, ironical 
utterances (see section 3).
Rejecting : as we saw in examples (2) and (3), in negative sentences, the 
theory highlights two semantic contents: one affirmative and the other 
negative, and the discourse will be developed argumentatively following the 
negative content and prohibiting the affirmative content to be developed. 
At that moment, the theory states that the speaker rejects the affirmative 
content. In other words, negative sentences are, so to speak, marked to have 
rejected content, but we will see another case of rejection without explicit 
rejection markers (see section 3).
Granting : this utterance mode is very near to what semantics traditionally 
calls ‘ presupposition ’, in that the speaker approves the semantic content 
while it is kept in the background so that it cannot be developed in discourse. 
In the utterance ‘ He quit smoking ’, the speaker grants the content [He used 
to be a smoker], in that he/she acknowledges his smoking habit, but he/
she will not develop this content in discourse. This content remains in the 
background despite the speaker's acknowledgement.
 Before ending this theoretical presentation, the following fact must 
be emphasised: the tones and the utterance modes operate independently 
of each other; a semantic content with the Speaker's tone can be rejected 
(see the APT description of irony in section 3) or a semantic content in 
the Other's tone can be endorsed by the speaker. This latter case could be 
called ‘ unquestioning discourse ’ nourishing rumours or hate speeches. In 
this fabricated example - ‘ They say that the farm products from Fukushima 
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are totally safe; let's eat them to support the region ’ - the first part has an 
explicit marker of the Other's tone, while the latter content ‘ let's eat them ... ’ 
indicates that the speaker endorses the content of the first half; we all know 
that discourses of this sort are very common in everyday conversation.
2.2.3  Gradualness of utterance modes: Endorsing/rejecting continuum
 In Carel's original framework, endorsing, rejecting and granting are 
considered to be (textual) ‘ functions ’ given to the content and they are 
not gradual. For this paper, however, the observation about gradualness of 
utterance modes is essential, so that in discourse we can see cases in which 
endorsing or rejecting is more or less weakened. As a result, we also observe 
that an extremely weakened endorsing is very close to rejecting and an 
extremely weakened rejecting is so close to endorsing.
(8)　I will introduce you to this friend of mine;
　 　a. you will be good friends.
　 　b. you will surely be good friends.
　 　c. you will probably be good friends.
　 　d. you will possibly be good friends.
These are examples to which more and more restrictive modality markers 
are added. From the point of view of utterance mode, in the four examples, 
the semantic content [you will be good friends] is endorsed, permitting such 
argumentative developments as: ‘ so, shall we go for dinner? ’ and that will 
be an instantiation of such an argumentative aspect as [possible friendship 
TF go for a dinner]. On the other hand, we can clearly see that there are 
differences concerning the extent of endorsing the semantic content [you 
will be good friends], so that, as an instantiation of the argumentative aspect 
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[possible friendship TF go for a dinner], (8d) is quite precarious, while we 
feel assured with (8a) or (8b). The original APT framework does not allow 
such gradualness and this is why we opted to rename it utterance mode to 
take into account such kinds of gradualness.
3. Irony, banter, litotes and euphemism in the SBT/APT frameworks
 In this section, we aim to give an overview to describe irony, banter, 
litotes and euphemism in terms of the SBT and the APT frameworks, 
especially in order to show that all these figures can be organised in the 
same argumentative configuration.
3.1 Irony and banter
3.1.1  Irony
 In this paper, the term ‘ irony ’ is used to refer only to the typical 
antiphrastic irony. Actually, we can find prior research about the antiphrastic 
irony within the APT/SBT frameworks: Ducrot (2010) and Carel (2011b).
 Ducrot (2010) analyses the antiphrastic irony from the APT standpoint, 
by drawing an interesting comparison between irony and negative utterance. 
In order to understand Ducrot's point, let us compare the following two 
examples: an ordinary negative utterance and a typical ironical one.
(9)　a.　I didn ’t enjoy this restaurant: the steak was too tough.　(negative)
　 　b.　 I enjoyed this restaurant: the steak was as tender as a leather boot.    
(irony)
In a negative utterance like the first part of (9a), according to the theory, 
there are two semantic contents: [I enjoyed this restaurant] and NEG-[I 
enjoyed this restaurant] and the speaker rejects the first one to endorse the 
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second one. This is the type of description of a negative utterance we have 
already seen in the preceding section.
 Regarding an ironical utterance like (9b), on the other hand, Ducrot 
makes the following remarks. For this utterance to be ironical, the speaker 
cannot endorse the content of the first sentence: [I enjoyed this restaurant], 
even though this content is brought into discourse with the Speaker's tone. 
This first sentence, however, contrary to the negative sentence in (9a), bears 
no explicit marker of rejecting, but we know that the content is rejected 
thanks to the context - in this particular case, by the second utterance 
‘ the steak was as tender as a leather boot ’ . What distinguishes irony from 
a normal negative utterance is that in irony, while the presented semantic 
content is rejected by the speaker, there is no endorsed content for all that. 
Irony can therefore be characterised, according to the APT, as an utterance 
the content of which is rejected without explicit marker of rejection and 
which contains no (substitutive) endorsed content.
 From the SBT standpoint, Carel (2011b) gives a more convincing 
explanation on the contextual factor for irony. According to this paper, the 
ironical effect is engendered by an absurd instantiation of an argumentative 
aspect. Let us compare the two following examples in (10).
(10)　a.　 I loved this restaurant: the steak was so tender.  
 (normal utterance)
　　　b.　 I loved this restaurant: the steak was as tender as a leather boot.  
 (irony) (=(9b))
We can say that both statements are instantiations of the same argumentative 
aspect that can be described as [good food TF like the restaurant]. The 
utterance (10a) is, so to speak, a normal instantiation of this argumentative 
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aspect in that good food is instantiated as a tender steak, while we can see 
immediately that (10b) is an absurd instantiation because of the phrase 
‘ leather boot ’ . Carel (ibid.) argues that this absurdity of instantiation is 
what characterises the ironical effect of an utterance and by mediating the 
two papers - Ducrot's (APT) and Carel's (SBT) - we can say that this 
absurdity is precisely what makes us notice the rejective utterance mode of 
an ironical utterance, providing a suitable context for irony.
3.1.2  Banter
 According to Leech (1983), who characterises it felicitously, banter can 
be paired with irony from the verbal behavioural point of view:
While irony is an apparently friendly way of being offensive (mock 
politeness), the type of verbal behaviour known as ‘ banter ’ is an 
offensive way of being friendly. (mock impoliteness; Leech 1983: 144)
While Ducrot's and Carel's papers are concerned only with the typical irony 
case, we can see that bantering utterances can be described in the same 
way as irony in terms of the APT/SBT frameworks; that is, banter is also 
an absurd instantiation of an argumentative aspect by an utterance with its 
rejected semantic content in the Speaker's tone. In this way, some of Leech's 
examples (presented as (11) and (12)) can be described as follows ((13) 
and (14)):
(11)　What a mean, cowardly trick!　
(12)　a.　Here comes trouble!
　　　b.　Look what the cat's brought in! 
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(13)　 argumentative chain: What a mean, cowardly trick! (I appreciate his 
cleverness)
　　　　　↑　instantiation (absurd)
　　　argumentative aspect: [good ability TF appreciate]
(14)　 argumentative chain: Here comes trouble! / Look what the cat's 
brought in! (I welcome him)
　　　　　↑　instantiation (absurd)
　　　argumentative aspect: [cool person TF welcome]
The blatant absurdity of instantiations observed here induces us to recognise 
the rejective utterance mode of the content [What a mean cowardly trick!], 
[Here comes trouble!] or [Look what the cat's brought in!] in each of these 
examples.
 If this description is correct, it means that in the APT/SBT frameworks, 
banter is described precisely in the same way as irony, that is, while the 
parallelism between irony and banter is supported, our frameworks do 
not allow us to distinguish between the two figures. Therefore, in order 
to complete the description, it will be effective to introduce the notions of 
‘ applausive ’ and ‘ accusative ’ in our description of the phenomenon; these two 
notions are not to be technically defined, but to be interpreted intuitively. 
A discourse is applausive when it is developed to praise someone or the 
situation in question and it is accusative when it is developed to blame 
someone or the situation in question. To sum it up:
(15)　Irony and banter
　　　 a. Irony and banter are both speech effects observed when a semantic 
content in the Speaker's tone is uttered in rejective utterance mode. 
This rejective utterance mode, ordinarily given to the affirmative 
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content in a negative utterance, can be taken on by an ironical or 
a bantering utterance, thanks to the fact that they are both absurd 
instantiations of an argumentative aspect attached to the utterance in 
question.
　　　 b. When the utterance in question is brought into an accusative 
discourse (with mock politeness), the utterance is considered to be 
ironical. On the other hand, when it is brought into an applausive 
discourse (with mock impoliteness), the utterance is considered to be 
bantering.
3.2 Litotes
 To make a long story short and instead of setting off on a long 
definitional discussion, this paper distinguishes litotes from euphemism in a 
few words: litotes and euphemism both consist in saying something less than 
what should be said, but the point of litotes is to do so by emphasising the 
gap between what is said and what should be said, while the attenuation in 
euphemism is, on the contrary, to make the situation more unremarkable and 
it is motivated mainly by politeness considerations.
 Now, let us examine litotes in more detail. As litotes consists in 
emphasising the gap between the words and the situation, this figure 
inclines, evidently, to get closer to irony and banter, and litotes is sometimes 
rephrased by ‘ ironical understatement ’ (Wilson 2006). As mentioned in the 
beginning, it was this paper's decision to keep the word ‘ irony ’ only for the 
typical antiphrastic irony, but if not, we could consider at least some litotes 
cases as a subtype of irony (or of banter if it is applausive). Anyway, as 
Ducrot's and Carel's analyses of irony were limited to the typical instances, 
now, we must apply the APT/SBT frameworks to litotes, with necessary 
modifications of these theories.
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 In terms of the APT, what is characteristic in litotes compared to 
irony is that in litotical utterances, the rejective utterance mode is not 
complete and this is precisely why we need the gradualness of utterance 
mode, by departing from the notion of ‘ textual function ’ in the original APT 
framework, which does not allow it. As was the case for the irony/banter 
distinction, we can find ‘ ironical litotes ’ and ‘ bantering litotes ’, which can be 
paraphrased respectively as ‘ attenuated irony ’ and ‘ attenuated banter ’ .
3.2.1  Bantering litotes (attenuated banter)
 Let us examine bantering litotes first, because, in our definition of the 
term, litotes is more easily formed as bantering than as irony, as far as those 
realised in negative utterance are concerned.
 Let us imagine a situation in which you were invited to your friend's 
home and she welcomed you with a feast as excellent as what you would 
find in a luxurious restaurant, which was cooked by her husband. And then 
if you say something like (16) below, which is blatantly out of place for the 
situation, your utterance can be understood as a case of bantering litotes.
(16)　Your husband is not a bad cook.
In a similar situation in which you are really very close to your friend and 
her husband, it is possible to banter more explicitly, like in (17):
(17)　Your husband is a terribly bad cook!
 In terms of the SBT, (16) and (17) can both be described as more or 
less absurd instantiation of an argumentative aspect.
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(18)　 argumentative chain: Your husband is not a bad cook. (I appreciate his 
talent)
　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [excellent talent TF appreciate]
(19)　 argumentative chain: Your husband is a terribly bad cook. (I appreciate 
his talent)
　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [excellent talent TF appreciate]
 We can see that in both cases, there is an absurd instantiation of the 
argumentative aspect: [excellent talent TF appreciate], but we can see 
also that, compared to the typical ‘ antiphrastic ’ banter in (17) (see (19)), 
the absurdity in the bantering litotes case is attenuated. An excellent 
gastronomic talent is blatantly contradictory to ‘ a terribly bad cook ’, but ‘ not 
a bad cook ’ is not a contradictory description of the situation, but simply 
seriously insufficient. Therefore, it can be said that the rejecting utterance 
mode in litotes is attenuated, while it is complete in bare irony. 
3.2.2  Ironical litotes
 Ironical litotes can be described exactly in the same way as bantering 
litotes. So let us compare just one example of ironical litotes to a plain irony 
that could be possible in the same situation. The context in which examples 
(20) and (21) could be ironical would be that you talk about an extremely 
drunk person in a bar, who is talking incoherently and even raving. And if 
you say, with a wry smile something like (20), you would make an ironical 
litotes about this person, while if you say something like (21), it would be an 
antiphrastic bare irony. This last case would be all the more effective if this 
person had told you beforehand that he is perfectly sober, which would be a 
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case where the echoic interpretation of irony (Wilson 2006) can be typically 
effective.
(20) He is a bit drunk, this guy.
(21) Yes, he is perfectly sober.
 As both examples are more or less ironical, in our theoretical 
framework, the semantic content included in both of them must be uttered 
in the rejecting utterance mode and for that, they have to be absurd 
instantiations of an argumentative aspect, as the following descriptions 
indicate:
(22)　argumentative chain: He is a bit drunk. (He must calm down)
　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [drunk TF need to calm down]
(23)　argumentative chain: He is perfectly sober. (He must calm down)
　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [drunk TF need to calm down]
Here again, in the case of ironical litotes (22), the absurdity of the instantiation 
of the argumentative aspect is attenuated, that is, being a bit drunk is not as 
contradictory to being dead drunk as being perfectly sober is. As a result, 
the rejective utterance mode is also attenuated to output an attenuated irony.
3.3 Euphemism
 In the previous section (3.2), we made a distinction between litotes and 
euphemism, but it may be that the border is not clear for some readers. 
Therefore, an utterance like (20), ‘ He is a bit drunk ’ could be understood as 
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a case of euphemism, by modifying the context. For example, let us say, you 
were the concierge of a luxury hotel and the dead drunk man in question 
is one of your most important customers. You are obliged to be as polite 
as possible to him. Then, if you say to him ‘ You are a bit drunk, sir ’, your 
utterance is no longer a litotes, but a case of euphemism because you have 
no intention of emphasising the gap between your words and the actual 
situation, but, on the contrary, you try to minimise verbally the terribleness 
of the situation.
 How can all this be described within the APT/SBT frameworks? While 
litotes consists in, though attenuated, the rejective utterance mode of the 
expressed semantic content, the speaker of euphemism must endorse the 
semantic content of the utterance. Euphemism is motivated principally by 
politeness and in order to be really polite (not mock polite), the speaker 
has to be more or less sincere in his/her words; that is to say, he/she must 
more or less endorse his/her semantic content. With this point in mind, let us 
delve into the issue by beginning with what we call ‘ mitigative euphemism ’, 
followed by ‘ condescending euphemism ’ .
3.3.1  Mitigative euphemism
 The example ‘ You are a bit drunk, sir ’ of the concierge confronted with 
his dead drunk customer is typically a case of mitigative euphemism. At the 
current moment of this paper's research, this type of euphemism is described 
in the same way as the ironical litotes at the level of the SBT, which is 
shown in (24) below and the difference between them can be described at 
the level of the APT framework, as a question of utterance mode.
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(24)　argumentative chain: You are a bit drunk. (You must calm down)
　　　　　　　　　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [drunk THEREFORE need to calm down]
 The SBT level description is identical for the ironical litotes and for the 
mitigative euphemism: an absurd instantiation of an argumentative aspect. 
It is at the APT level that we can observe the difference: in the ironical 
litotes, as we have seen, the absurd instantiation gives rise to the rejective 
utterance mode to the content, even though the rejection is attenuated. 
In the mitigative euphemism, on the contrary, the speaker endorses the 
content despite the SBT level absurdity and this endorsing is motivated by 
politeness. It can be said that politeness is something that can be ostensively 
shown by presenting one's polite linguistic attitude and in this particular 
case, it is this ‘ challenging ’ endorsing of the absurd instantiation that 
substantiates the polite attitude of the speaker. But of course, this type of 
utterance is liable to be ironical if the absurdity of the instantiation is too 
strong to be concealed by politeness, which is precisely why the distinction 
between mitigative euphemism and ironical litotes is obscured, and we can 
practically exploit this ambiguity by ironising while pretending to be polite.
3.3.2  Condescending euphemism
 Euphemism is a linguistic strategy to attenuate the content of the 
utterance to avoid a shock that one could give because of its directness. 
While this strategy is used for mitigating the aggressiveness of the content, 
as in the mitigative euphemism we have just mentioned, it is also used for 
condescending, that is, to attenuate self-praise. In this paper, this type of 
euphemism is called ‘ condescending euphemism ’ .
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(25)　My son speaks French tolerably well.
 Someone can say (25) even though his/her son speaks French perfectly 
and its argumentative mechanism can be described similarly to the 
mitigative euphemism.
(26)　 argumentative chain: My son speaks French tolerably well. (So he 
won the speech contest)
　　　　　　　　↑　instantiation
　　　argumentative aspect: [excellent TF win]
 If the word ‘ absurd ’ is too strong, this instantiation is at least too weak 
regarding the conclusion to be drawn. And the politeness effect is derived 
from the fact that the speaker is endorsing the content despite this gap 
between the argumentative aspect in question and the actual argumentative 
chain.
4. Conclusion
 To sum up all these observations, the following remarks can be made:
1.　 In irony, banter, litotes and euphemism, one can observe a more or less 
absurd instantiation of an evoked argumentative aspect.
2.　 In irony, banter and litotes, the main semantic content is brought into 
discourse with the rejective utterance mode, without (substitutive) 
endorsed content.
3.　 Irony and banter can be described similarly in the APT/SBT frameworks, 
while an utterance in question becomes ironical if it is oriented toward 
an accusative discourse and becomes bantering if it is oriented toward an 
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applausive discourse.
4.　 Litotes can be ironical or bantering according to the same standard as 
stated in 3, but the absurdity of the instantiation of an argumentative 
aspect is less strong than the bare irony and banter. As a result, the 
utterance takes on the attenuated rejective utterance mode to be realised 
as attenuated irony or banter.
5.　 Euphemism is also a case of an absurd instantiation of an argumentative 
aspect, but in euphemism, the semantic content of the utterance in 
question must be endorsed, even modestly, by the speaker.
 To conclude, all the figures of speech discussed in this paper can be 
described in the configurative schema below (Figure 2) and they are located 
on the scale of the utterance mode, the two poles of which are endorsing and 
rejecting.
Figure 2: Figures of speech on the utterance mode scale
 One could instantly point out a possible serious problem in this 
configurative schema: on one sole scale, two opposing utterance modes are 
contrastively disposed, but in doing so, the vanishing points of these two 
utterance modes could be supposed: is zero endorsing equal to full rejecting, 
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and vice versa, or is there a neutral point where the semantic content 
is neither endorsed nor rejected? And furthermore, how is the granting 
utterance mode to be located on the scale? All these questions must be put 
off until our forthcoming research. We hope, nevertheless, to have outlined 
the semantic interrelations among the figures of speech examined in this 
paper. 
Note
１）This research was financially supported by the Kansai University Secondary Fund for 
Research, 2017.
２）The basic notions of the SBT and the APT presented in this section are principally 
based on Carel (2011a) and Carel (2012), but as noted below, this paper proposes some 
theoretical modifications (including a terminological one) necessary to our analysis. 
３） The term ‘ transgressive ’ is to be understood as infringement and not as transcendental.
４）This paper is not a corpus-based study, which means that most of the examples are 
made up for explanation, unless otherwise noted. Needless to say, the findings in this 
paper will have to be verified more empirically henceforth. 
５）‘ Semantic content ’ here could be comparable to ‘ propositional meaning ’ in semantics, 
but these two notions are fundamentally different in that the former does not suppose 
the truth condition for calculating the meaning of the utterance, while the latter 
supposes it by definition. 
６）Okinawa is an island prefecture situated in the southwest of the mainland and 74% 
of the American military bases in Japan are located in Okinawa, covering 18% of the 
prefecture's area.
７）The order ( ‘ firstly ’ and ‘ secondly ’ ) given to the interpretative process of the negative 
utterance is nevertheless not to indicate its temporal nature, but to show readily the 
discreteness of the two contents.
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